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1. Introduction 
… economists have long considered “reputations” and brand names to be private devices which 
provide incentives that assure contract performance in the absence of any third-party enforcer. This 
private-contract enforcement mechanism relies upon the value to the firm of repeat sales to satisfied 
customers as a means of preventing nonperformance. However, it is possible that economic agents 
with well known brand names and reputation for honoring contracts may find it wealth 
maximizing to break such long-term exchange relationships and obtain a temporary increase in 
profit. 
Klein and Leffler (1981) 
 
          Many interesting financial problems involve asymmetries of information between the 
seller and potential buyers of a good. In the seminal “lemons” paradigm of Ackerlof (1970), 
the fact that the seller has superior information about the quality of the assets being sold 
implies that the goods being sold would be of lower than average quality, eventually leading 
to market failure. However, the situation is less obvious if there are repeated sales, as the 
above quotation suggests. For example, producers may initially be compelled to produce a 
higher quality product than otherwise optimal in order to overcome this “lemons premium.” 
The repeated game setting thus creates a tension between the incentives to exploit 
informational asymmetries and the value of establishing a reputation for quality. The 
optimality of various strategies depends on, inter alia, the speed of information dissemination 
and the gains to reputation building. 
          There are numerous models (briefly overviewed in the third section of this paper) that 
analyze this sequence of quality-setting decisions. This theory focuses on a producer that has 
the ability to change its quality1 in each period of a multi-period, discrete-time (potentially 
infinite-period) model. However, these models have undergone relatively little empirical 
testing. Motivated by this gap in the literature, this study uses a unique database of returns 
on real estate limited partnerships (RELPs) to empirically investigate quality-setting strategies 
of the producer. We run two basic tests; first, we test whether producers choose to initially 
build a reputation for quality and then produce lower quality goods in subsequent periods. In 
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this case, we should observe a decreasing trend in the returns on the sequence of offerings of 
a given sponsor. Secondly, we test for mixing strategies, where the producer alternatively 
selects quality from either a high or a low quality regime. In this case we should be able to 
identify two statistically different distributions of the producer’s observed quality. 
          The RELP market provides an ideal setting for evaluating predictions concerning 
quality/reputation strategies for several important reasons. Firstly, almost all empirical 
studies on the links between reputation and quality are based on inferences gained from 
experimental settings.2 Secondly, RELPs are perhaps more amenable to testing the 
theoretical predictions of quality/reputation models than the few studies that use real data.3 
In particular, the RELPs in our study are established as “blind pools,” that is, the funds for 
the partnership are raised prior to the developer actually purchasing any properties. This 
means that the developer (producer) has a great deal of flexibility in setting the quality level 
of the partnership. Absent significant reputation effects, there are thus incentives for the 
developer to take advantage of these information asymmetries. However, over time, as the 
cash flows from the properties are realized, the quality of the developer (and the RELP) is 
gradually revealed, albeit with some noise. In our analysis, we equate the “true quality” of a 
partnership with the adjusted holding period returns (i.e., returns relative to a RELP index 
and adjusted for year of origination) to the partnership unit holder. Finally, our data are 
extensive enough, in terms of observations of individual developers and of a given 
developer’s offerings, to allow for reasonable statistical inferences.  
           We find that, consistent with the theoretical predictions of the reputation building 
hypothesis, the average quality decreasing with each successive partnership issued by a given 
sponsor. This result is valid in the aggregate as well as for the majority of the sponsors in our 
sample. We also find that some producers engage in mixing strategies, producing high quality 
in some periods and low quality in others. Although our results might be influenced by 
                                                                                                                                                 
1See Tirole (1988) for an overview of the economic literature on quality and reputation. 
2 Examples include articles dealing with learning and reputation in bargaining games (for example, Roth and 
Schoumaker (1984), Neelin, Sonnenschein and Spiegel (1985) and Binmore, Shaked and Sutton (1985)), tests 
of reputation and entry deterrence (such as Jung, Kagel and Levin (1985), who test the chain store game of 
Selden (1978)), and more general tests of reputation and learning (e.g., Bloomfield (1994)). 
3The empirical studies of reputation effects that we are aware of using real data are: Slade (1992), who uses 
Kalman filtering to test for supergame pricing strategies in gasoline retailing; Zapan (1989), who tests for 
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survivorship or incubation bias (since poor sponsors are unlikely to be around long enough 
to produce many offerings) we find that this bias is not large enough to taint our general 
results. 
          The outline of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section two provides an 
overview of the basic institutional setting. Section three describes the most relevant 
economic models, while Section four describes the data. Section five analyzes our results and 
Section 6 presents our conclusions. An appendix reviews the relevant empirical 
methodology. 
2. Institutional environment 
          Real estate limited partnerships represent an important mechanism for individual 
investors to pool their resources to participate in real estate. In contrast to traditional 
securities, partnerships typically represent direct investment in businesses (such as real estate) 
and are not publicly traded. Moreover, partnerships are neither rated by a rating agency nor 
followed by Wall Street analysts. The general partner (GP) organizes and assumes 
responsibility for running the partnership. Partnerships are not required to publish the values 
of their assets and as such, calculating capital gains and market values accurately is difficult. 
Most public partnerships require a minimum investment of $1,000 to $5,000 and they are 
actively marketed to “small” investors. Typically, the partnership is structured as a blind pool 
wherein the general partner (the sponsor) has not bought any assets until the offering is 
completely sold. Legally, a partnership must have a finite life, which is usually set at 50 years 
or more, to allow the general partner flexibility in timing the sale of properties.  
          Market participants in the initial offerings are almost always small individual investors, 
while institutions dominate the secondary market. Secondary market trading in these RELPs 
is done at substantial discounts (an average of 45%) to appraised value. These points are 
elucidated in Barber (1996, p.490): 
The relation between current yields, leverage and discounts supports an agency cost explanation 
for the observed discounts. Reputation is particularly critical in the market for limited 
                                                                                                                                                 
predatory pricing behavior in cable television leasing; Gorton (1996), who analyzes reputation formation in 19th 
century bank note markets. 
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partnerships, which are traded in an unorganized secondary market and have been consistently 
plagued by negative coverage in the financial press. 
The general partner usually has complete discretion on what properties to purchase. For 
example, the prospectus of First Capital Income Properties Series VII reads:  
No specific properties have yet been identified for acquisition by the partnership as of the 
date of this prospectus, and the General Partners have complete discretion in investing the 
proceeds of this offering.”  
We sampled over 50 prospectuses of different partnerships and different sponsors. Only one 
had information on a few properties that the general partner intended to purchase with the 
proceeds of the offering.  
          With regard to the sale of properties, the partnership agreement does not usually bind 
the general partner in any way. However, many of the prospectuses have statements on 
when the general partner intends to start selling the property. A typical example from a 
partnership sponsored by JMB Corporation reads:  
The partnership intends to hold the real properties it acquires until such time as sale or other 
disposition appears to be advantageous from the viewpoint of the Partnership's investment 
objectives. In general, the Partnership intends to sell or refinance properties between the fifth and 
twelfth years after acquisition … However, the Corporate general partner will not be obligated to 
sell properties at any particular time. 
 Most of the partnership agreements stated expected time of sale between the fifth and 
fifteenth years. From the supplemental information provided subsequent to the offering, it 
was determined the proceeds are invested, in most part, within two years of the offering. 
          Because of the informational asymmetries associated with this organizational form, 
RELPs are particularly susceptible to the agent (general partner or sponsor) choosing actions 
that are suboptimal from the principal’s (limited partner or unit holder)  perspective. This 
issue of conflicting incentives between the general and limited partners has been well 
documented. An example is Wolfson’s (1991) empirical analysis of oil and gas tax shelter 
programs; he cites the following excerpt from a drilling prospectus: 
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Should a Partnership acquire or lease or participate in drilling or producing operations on a 
Prospect in proximity to that of the General Partner or its Affiliates, the results of such activity by 
the Partnership may gratuitously benefit the General Partner or its Affiliates ... [This may] result 
in profits to the general Partner or its Affiliates, and such profits will not be paid to the 
Partnerships. 
          In our setting, the flurry of investor lawsuits involving misdealing, fraud and deceptive 
sales practices against the brokerage houses selling these RELPs provide us with ex-post 
evidence of these incentive problems. These lawsuits have led the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to investigate whether Wall Street firms such as Dean Witter, Paine Webber, 
Merrill Lynch, Shearson and Prudential Securities, among others, misrepresented partnership 
risk and rewards.4 These observations suggest that, in the primary market, general partners 
might take advantage of relatively uninformed buyers. In the secondary market, as more 
information on asset quality is revealed, we expect prices to reflect more rational levels. This 
allows us to reasonably accurately assess the underlying quality of the RELP over time in our 
empirical analysis. However, it should be noted that our tests cannot rule out other possible 
explanations for the evolution of the market. For example, it is plausible that, as the market 
for RELPs developed, investors became more familiar with the risk-return tradeoffs and 
thus the market risk premium for RELPs changed. We mitigate this bias by adjusting our 
measure of quality for year of RELP issuance, as is clarified in Section 4. 
          There has been relatively little research into limited partnerships, particularly real 
estate limited partnerships. Most studies focus on RELP performance. Rogers and Owers 
(1985) find that only investors in the highest marginal tax bracket earn an adequate after-tax 
return. Kapplin and Schwartz (1986) re-evaluate the performance characteristics of publicly 
offered RELPs using secondary market prices and find that the returns in Rogers and Owers 
(1985) are overstated.5 Kapplin and Schwartz (1988) find that returns on pre-1981 RELPs 
are similar to institutional grade real estate, while more recent RELPs tend to under perform 
                                                 
4These Wall Street firms are not only the biggest marketers of partnerships but they also sponsor the 
partnerships.  For example, Paine Webber sold about $2 billion in limited partnerships according to the NY 
Times (November 28, 1994), including the Paine Webber real estate partnership. 
5The differential in the returns between the two studies is partly attributable to the sample size (Kapplin and 
Schwartz had a larger sample), the age of the partnerships (Kapplin and Schwartz had younger RELPs), the 
time period examined, and subjective classifications of the distinction between income-oriented and tax-
oriented RELPs. 
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institutional properties. Kallberg and Liu (1995) relate recent RELP performance to 
characteristics of sponsors and underlying properties; they find that the sponsor is one of the 
most important determinants of RELP performance. 
3. Economic modeling 
          The theoretical starting point for this type of modeling is the lemons model of 
Ackerlof (1970). In this model, informational asymmetries can result in market failure. This 
model has been extensively tested; see, for example, Rosenman and Wilson (1991) and 
Genosove (1993). A theoretical solution to this potential market failure is to embed the 
problem in a multi-period setting; the seller’s motives to capitalize on its informational 
advantages are then mitigated by reputation effects. 
          Our empirical work can most easily be interpreted through Shapiro’s (1983b) and 
Diamond’s (1989) multi-period models of reputation formation although the literature on 
“experience goods” is also relevant.6 The earlier quality setting model of Shapiro (1982, 
1983a, 1983b)) assumes that the producer is a monopolist that sets quantity and quality at 
each point in time so as to maximize expected utility by solving for an equilibrium quality 
setting strategy. He shows (Theorem 4) that (under mild concavity assumptions) there exist 
steady-state quality and quantity levels. He also shows that for sufficiently high levels of 
reputation, it cannot pay to build up reputation continually. This eventual decline in quality is 
a testable hypothesis. Shapiro, less formally, also analyzes the possibility of mixing behavior.  
          The later model of Diamond (1989, 1991) using the Kreps-Wilson (1982) sequential 
equilibrium paradigm,7 considers the possibility of gaming behavior among the producers 
and buyers. A key component in his model is the evolution of the producer’s reputation.           
Diamond’s model begins with a group of “observationally equivalent” borrowers. One 
group can invest only in a safe (single-period) project; another group can invest only in a 
risky, negative net present value project; a third group has access to both projects. All 
                                                 
6Experience goods are goods whose quality cannot be determined precisely in one period. The usual setting 
either involves the producer choosing the mean of the quality distribution or, alternatively, quality can only be 
observed with noise. In either case, typically some type of Bayesian updating is used to revise the estimates of 
the producer’s quality in each period. 
7An important offshoot of this literature, somewhat tangential to our focus, deals with the use of price and 
advertising as a signal of quality; see, for example, Milgrom and Roberts (1982). 
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projects last one period and lenders cannot observe project realizations. In the initial period, 
all borrowers are identical so that all are charged the same borrowing rate. However, in 
subsequent periods, potential lenders can observe whether or not the borrower defaulted. 
Diamond assumes that in each period a new set of lenders emerges knowing only the track 
record of potential borrowers. 
          The equilibrium concept is the sequential Nash equilibrium of Kreps and Wilson 
(1982). In this equilibrium, any borrower that defaults will subsequently be unable to borrow. 
This implies that the equilibrium interest rate will decline over time as the aggregate quality 
of remaining borrowers improves. This decline in interest rates provides an empirical test of 
reputation formation in the aggregate. This, and other aspects of Diamond’s model, is tested 
in Gorton (1996), which examines the market for bank notes in the 19th century. Gorton 
finds statistically significant evidence for a reputation effect in note prices. In addition to 
inferences about the aggregate population, Diamond’s model also has empirical predictions 
about the behavior of individual borrowers. One that will be tested in our model is the 
presence of mixed strategies in the equilibrium.8 
          While Diamond’s model is about debt markets, it is a very powerful tool for modeling 
reputation effects.9 In addition, many of the model’s assumptions are reasonably credible in 
our empirical setting. Our sponsor’s choice of assets to be placed in a blind pool 
corresponds well with Diamond’s borrowers’ selection of projects. Defaults would 
correspond to poor outcomes. Since the primary market for these RELPs is individual 
investors, the assumption of new lenders in each period is reasonably well met, as is the 
lenders’ inability to use other characteristics to determine borrower quality. 
          While in most multi-period models of this type, optimal strategies tend, in equilibrium, 
to converge to pure strategies, there are additional reasons for considering mixed strategies 
in our context. Firstly, in finite-period problems with learning, mixed strategies can persist.10 
Secondly, when one agent has private information and follows a pure strategy, it can appear 
to other observers that the agent is following a mixed strategy. This point (often referred to 
                                                 
8 The conditions for the existence of mixed strategies are given in Diamond’s Lemma 11. 
9 While developed as a model for debt markets, Diamond (1989: p.829) notes that his model is also applicable 
to reputation formation in general.   
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as a purification theorem) is made in Harsanyi (1973) and developed in Milgrom and Weber 
(1985) and Kreps (1990).   
          Although the model setting that Shapiro employs differs from that of Diamond, both 
models yield similar implications. In particular, producers choose to initially build a 
reputation for quality and then produce lower quality goods in subsequent periods. If this 
proposition holds, then we should observe a decreasing trend in the returns on the sequence 
of offerings of a given sponsor. There is also a possibility that producers engage in mixing 
strategies. If this is the case, then we should observe two different quality distributions. 
4. Experimental data and design 
          Data on secondary market prices, liquidations and cash distributions were obtained 
from Robert A. Stanger & Company beginning in January 1, 1990 and ending in December 
31, 1995. The time period studied coincides with the advent of reported secondary market 
prices for RELPs. All partnerships studied are publicly registered and are blind pools. 
Sponsors with less than six RELPs were excluded from our individual sponsor statistical 
analysis since there would be insufficient time series data; this results in a sample of 253 
RELPs although the larger sample of 308  is used in computing the benchmark returns. 
Excluded from all of the subsequent analysis are partnerships that did not trade or traded 
very infrequently. As such, the data are biased towards actively traded partnerships of 
relatively large sponsors.  
          Origination dates associated with the partnerships studied range from 1977 to 1989. 
The total dollar volume of RELPs outstanding versus the amount in our sample is depicted 
in Figure 1. Our data represent 55% of the total. The remaining 45% are mainly RELPs that 
did not trade in the secondary market, making it impossible to determine their rates of 
return. The annual fluctuation in total volumes is substantial and reflects the large number of 
issues in the early 80’s and the subsequent liquidation of older RELPs. Although the earlier 
RELPs are likely to be liquidating a significant number of their properties over our price 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 See Bloomfield (1994) for an example and corresponding experimental testing of a mixed strategy 
equilibrium. 
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observation window, we find that the amount of liquidation does not significantly affect 
returns.11   
          Returns used in the following analysis are holding period returns calculated over the 
1990 through 1995 observation window. There is one excess (total-period) return associated 
with each RELP calculated as follows. Initially, the total raw return in each quarter is 
calculated for each RELP based on observed transaction prices and cash distributions 
(liquidations and dividends).12 These raw returns are then modified by two factors. First, we 
compute the excess return by deducting the benchmark RELP return, which is an equally 
weighted average of all RELP returns available in the given quarter, from the raw return. 
Second, from this excess return, we make a further adjustment to account for trend or 
learning in our data. An OLS regression was run on average excess RELP returns versus 
dummy variables for the year of origination. These dummy variable coefficients are then 
used to adjust the excess RELP return for year of origination.13 Thus, the quality of a given 
RELP is the raw holding period return adjusted for the benchmark return and year of origin. 
We call this figure the adjusted return. Henceforth, this adjusted return will be our empirical 
proxy for the “true quality” of the RELP. In the context of the Shapiro or Diamond models, 
it reflects the quality level chosen by the sponsor. This characterization corresponds to the 
experience goods setting, since the buyer cannot establish the true quality of the asset until a 
significant amount of time has passed. 
          We first test for trends in average quality. The tests are based on splitting the sequence 
of a developer’s partnerships into halves and performing simple tests for mean and variance 
shifts between the two subsamples. In the subsequent analysis, for each developer, we will 
refer to the first half of its RELP issues as the first period and the second half of its RELP 
issues as the second period. Naturally these “time periods” will differ for each developer. 
          We perform further tests (Quandt (1958, 1960, 1972), Brown, Durbin, and Evans 
(1972) and Quandt and Ramsey (1978)) to see if developers change their quality regimes or 
                                                 
11 A regression of return versus percentage of liquidation had an R2 of less than 1 percent and an insignificant  
F-statistic. 
12 In less than 1% of the cases a simple linear interpolation of prices was used if there was a quarter without an 
observed price. 
13 An earlier version of this paper did not incorporate this trend correction. Those results are qualitatively 
nearly identical to those given below and are available from the authors upon request. 
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engage in mixing strategies. For example, the finding of a higher variance in the first period 
and a lower mean in the second, is consistent both with markets learning more about the 
appropriate risk premium for a given developer, and with a strategy of mixing from a 
distribution in the first period (in order to make it difficult to uncover quality in the first 
period) and then in the second period to milk its reputation (in the parlance of Shapiro) by 
producing lower quality goods. This strategy is, in a sense, a variant of the reputation 
building story, where the developer, instead of building a reputation, injects variance into its 
quality level. The details of these tests are described in the appendix. The tests are also 
performed on a pooled basis to test for overall reputation effects. A t-  (F-) test is then 
computed to test if the mean (variance) in period 1 is higher than the mean in period 2. 
5. Empirical results  
Sample characteristics 
          Table 1 presents the general characteristics of our RELP sample. Panel A shows the 
total dividend payout by 1987 to 1989 as a percentage of initial capital. By the end of 1989, 
the average RELP had paid out 25.4% of its initial capital as dividends. The average leverage 
(total debt over total initial capital) in our sample is 27.3%. A measure of RELP quality, 
which we will use later in this section, is the rating given LPs by Partnership Profiles. It is a 
rating from 1 (the highest) to 5; separate ratings are given to financial condition and to cash 
distributions as of December 31, 1989; the respective averages for our sample are 1.69 and 
3.35. Panel B of Table 1 shows these RELP characteristics by RELP issuance sequence. The 
cost basis of the RELPs rises significantly from the first issue ($53.1 million) to the tenth 
RELP issued by a sponsor ($111.9 million). The Partnership Profile ratings for both financial 
condition and cash distributions decline slightly, although neither trend is significant. The 
downward trend in raw returns is also evident. The average cost basis value of our RELPs is 
$85.5 million. 
          Table 2 shows the mean semi-annual returns over our 6-year observation window 
(January 1990 to December 1995) organized by offering number; the figures are unadjusted 
returns formed from data on cash distributions and secondary market prices. The in-sample 
group consists of the 253 offerings by developers with at least 6 RELPs in the sample; the 
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out-of-sample group consists of the 55 offerings by developers with 5 or less RELPs.14 The 
most important feature is the trend of decreasing returns, which suggests an aggregate 
reputation effect. For the in-sample group, 6 of the first ten offerings have positive mean 
returns; 4 of offerings 11 through 20 have positive mean returns; none of offerings 21 
through 30 have positive mean returns. Note that it is difficult to draw too much statistical 
inference at this point because the number of observations drops off rapidly after offering 
number 13.15 Additionally, the data show no significant differences between the in-sample 
and out-of-sample average returns for offering number 1 through 5, suggesting that our 
results will not be overly influenced by survivorship or incubation bias. In the statistical 
analysis we will present detailed evidence of the reputation effect both on the aggregate level 
and for individual developers in our sample. 
          It is of interest to investigate the aggregate behavior of the RELP developers in our 
sample before focusing on individual developers. Figure 2 plots the adjusted return for each 
RELP ordered by issuance date. Thus, the x-axis value of i represents the adjusted return of 
the ith RELP for each developer. The regression of adjusted returns versus offering number 
shows a significant negative coefficient on offering number and a significant positive 
constant.16 This suggests that, even after censoring out developers with less than 6 RELPs, 
and after netting out aggregate market performance, the general quality of the RELPs 
declines with offering number. This indicates that, in the aggregate, developers in our sample 
engaged in reputation building. This result is a prediction of both the Shapiro model and the 
Diamond model.  
          The next series of statistical tests tries to identify which strategies individual 
developers may be following. Table 3 presents a test of mean and variance shifts. We find 
                                                 
14 The latter group is omitted from our more detailed statistical analysis because we judged that 5 RELPs was 
too small a sample to permit inferences about trends in quality. 
15 For the in-sample data, only 3 observations were significant at the .10 level. These were significant negative 
returns for offering number 9, 11 and 12. None of the out-of-sample observations were significantly different 
from zero. 
16 This regression uses White’s correction for heteroscedastic errors. It includes all sponsors (20) with 6 or 
more partnerships, yielding a total of 253 observations. The t-statistics are given in parentheses. The t-statistic 
on the slope coefficient is significant at the .003 level. 
R  =  .0418  −  .00487 × RELP number 
         (1.947)    (−2.989) 
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that 4 of the 20 developers (Century, CNL, Krupp and Prudential) have significantly lower 
means (at the .05 level) in the second half of their offerings. The pooled data and 3 
developers (Angeles, Insured and JMB) have significantly lower means at a significance level 
of .10. On the other hand, only Shurgard shows significantly higher returns in the second 
half of its offerings. Increasing returns are not predicted by any of the theoretical models.           
Although not a formal prediction of either Diamond’s or Shapiro’s model, Table 3 also 
suggests that the variance is decreasing over subsequent offerings. In particular, 3 of the 
developers have significantly lower variances (at the .05 level) in the second half of their 
offerings: Angeles, Krupp and Prudential. It is very interesting that each of these 3 also had 
significantly lower means in the first half of their offerings. 
Testing for regime shifts 
          To simplify our exposition, we focus on developers that showed a significant decline 
in adjusted return in the second half of their offerings and that had more than 10 offerings in 
our data.17 This leaves us with 5 developers: Angeles, Insured, JMB, Krupp and Prudential. 
For comparison, we also include aggregate results (when relevant) and results from the only 
developer, Shurgard, that had significantly higher quality in the second half of its offerings. 
          Testing for different quality regimes and mixed strategies is done in 3 stages. Initially 
we use the Quandt-Ramsey approach to test for mixtures of distributions. Secondly we 
compute the Quandt ratios for these 6 developers to provide an informal test. Finally, we use 
the Brown-Durbin-Evans (BDE) technique to test for the statistical significance of a 
possible regime shift. This analysis provides convincing evidence that some sponsors appear 
to exploit their informational advantages. To assist in the interpretation of these ratios, the 
adjusted returns are plotted in Figure 3. The appendix presents details on the statistical 
techniques used. 
                                                 
17 The results for all developers are contained in a previous draft of this paper, which is available from the 
authors. 
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          Table 4 reports the result of tests for mixtures of normals. 18 For the aggregate data, 
there is a 43% probability (λ) that returns are drawn from a distribution with a mean of 4.7% 
(µ1) and a 57% probability (1-λ) that returns are drawn from a distribution with a mean of 
−3.6% (µ2). This mean difference is significant at the .05 level, but the difference in standard 
deviations is not significant. Table 4 demonstrates that Angeles is primarily a low quality 
producer; the λ value indicates that there is a 91% probability that the mean adjusted return 
on an Angeles-issued RELP is −5.4% and a 9% probability that the return is 28.7%. Table 4 
also shows significant evidence of mixing behavior for Krupp. There is a 30% chance that 
returns are drawn from a distribution with a high return (44.9%) and a high standard 
deviation (17.6%); there is a 70% chance that the distribution has a mean of −11.5 and a 
standard deviation of only 3.2%. The trend of returns in Figure 3 indicates that prior to the 
seventh RELP issued, Krupp was primarily a high quality producer 
          The Quandt likelihood ratio and the BDE cumulative sum of squares are plotted 
against issuance sequence in Figure 4. The Quandt technique identifies the regime break as 
the maximum of the plotted maximum likelihood ratio. The BDE technique signals a regime 
shift if the graph of the cumulative sum of squares moves outside the 10% confidence band 
(indicated by the dotted lines). The techniques in Figure 4 jointly suggest that two of the 
developers in this subsample may be switching quality regimes: JMB (offering 4) and Krupp 
(offering 6). Generally the techniques are in agreement although, because of the sensitivity of 
these techniques to the initial observations, they can disagree. For example, with Prudential 
(offering 7), the Quandt ratio suggests a regime shift, but the BDE test fails to detect this. 
For Angeles, Insured and Shurgard, the test fails to reject the hypothesis of constant quality. 
These RELP sponsors either consistently produced the same quality or there were more than 
two switches between regimes. 
         The Quandt ratio shows that the change in quality occurred near the issuance of the 
fifth RELP offering by Angeles, while the BDE graph reveals that this quality change is 
                                                 
18 We do not report the R2 statistic in Table 2 because in nonlinear estimation, the R2 is not guaranteed to be in 
the range of zero to one.  That said however, all of our R2 were in the range of 98%-100%.  In lieu of the R2 
statistic, we report [σ 2 21= −n y h x bi i( , )]   , which is the maximum likelihood estimator. 
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insignificant at the 10% level. From Figure 3, it appears as if the fifth RELP issued was the 
only offering (with the possible exception of the third) that performed reasonably well, that 
is, was of “good” quality. The profile of the returns on Prudential-sponsored RELPs 
resembles that of Angeles in terms of the λ, µ1 and µ2 in Table 4. Figure 3 also shows some 
evidence that Prudential engaged in reputation building, since the trend in adjusted returns 
associated with sequential RELP offerings is generally positive and increasing until the 
seventh RELP offering, where the Quandt ratio indicates that a possible change in quality 
occurred. This change in quality is significant according to the BDE graph. As for Angeles, 
Table 4 shows that the means are statistically different. For Krupp, the returns from the first 
to the third RELP are increasing and suggest reputation building. Subsequent to the sixth 
offering, where the Quandt ratio in Figure 4 reveals that a shift in quality occurred, Krupp 
was a consistently low quality producer. This shift from high quality to low quality is also 
evidenced by noting that µ1 > µ2 and σ1 > σ2 from Table 3. As with Angeles and Prudential, 
this evidence is consistent with a reputation effect. 
Ex ante sponsor characteristics 
          Since these experiments suggest that certain developers in our sample have declining 
adjusted returns in their sequence of offerings, it is then interesting to investigate whether or 
not, ex ante, there are certain characteristics of the developer that affect this pattern of 
returns. This analysis is motivated by and related to the extensive literature dealing with 
equity offerings,19 specifically, the literature dealing with longer-term performance and the 
underwriting certification hypothesis.20 
          We initially investigate the relationship between sponsor characteristics and realized 
performance by analyzing the correlations between a set of developer characteristics21 and 
quality. The correlations are presented in Table 5. None of the correlations of sponsor 
characteristics versus quality are greater than .37 in absolute value. The negative correlations, 
although insignificant at the .01 level, correspond to characteristics that relate to increasing 
size of the sponsor: number of offerings, a dummy variable for sponsors that are publicly 
                                                 
19 Our primary focus is not on issues relating to IPO underpricing since our assessment of quality is based on 
longer-term performance. 
20 See, for example, Beatty and Ritter (1986) on the former issue, and Booth and Smith (1986) on the latter. 
21 See Table 5 for definitions. 
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traded, number of developer SICs and total offering size. This suggests that the “lemons 
premium” is smaller for larger sponsors, presumably because of their greater initial 
reputation. To augment these correlations, a logistic regression (not shown) was performed 
with the dependent variable differentiating developers with a significant decrease in means in 
the second half of their offerings (cf. Table 2) from the remaining developers. Using a step-
wise logistic approach, none of the sponsor variables were significant. This may be a further 
indication of the lack of transparency in this market. Even though these developers have 
observable ex ante characteristics that should lead investors to distinguish among them, 
apparently these differences have little influence on returns. 
Survival bias 
          There are a number of competing hypotheses to explain the declining trend in 
abnormal returns. The most appealing alternative explanation is learning, either by the 
market or by the developer. In the first case, the uncertainty of the quality of the sponsor’s 
offering declines as investors observe the performance of the earlier RELPs. In the second 
case, the developer acquires more skill in asset selection, financing, management or 
otherwise; this increasing skill leads to higher quality RELPs over time. Our data are also, in 
general, consistent with this interpretation. 
          There is another important factor that influences our empirical findings. Brown, 
Goetzmann and Ross (1995), henceforth BGR, show that survival bias can lead to the 
finding of decreasing returns over time (as in the Diamond and Shapiro model) as well as 
decreasing variance over time. This survivorship bias has two possible effects on our 
analysis. Firstly, our statistical tests are run with only those developers that have issued six or 
more partnerships. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, survival bias affects even those 
developers that were included in our sample. As pointed out by BGR, we would expect that 
developers of lower quality would have a higher probability of being censored out of our 
sample. Thus, the negative trend in returns, rather than being an outcome of a conscious 
attempt by the developer to build up a reputation, could merely result from the fact that 
surviving developers had “lucky” outcomes in their initial partnerships. Similarly, high 
variance developers would have a greater probability of being censored out of our data. 
          We address the first potential problem by comparing the mean (unadjusted) returns 
on sponsors with less than six partnerships (the out-of-sample group), with those included in 
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our sample. We further restrict the out-of-sample group by deleting the sponsors that issued 
RELPs after 1990, which would not have been included in our sample. Although the out-of-
sample group has a slightly higher mean return, a simple t-test indicates that the means are 
insignificantly different from each other. 22 To address the second survival bias effect, we 
regress the excess returns of the partnerships on a series of dummy variables for the year in 
which the partnership was formed. There is no apparent pattern in the dummy variables. A 
survival explanation would imply that partnerships formed earlier should have higher 
returns. Nevertheless, to account for possible year-specific effects, we conduct the above 
statistical tests on the returns adjusted for these dummy variable effects.23 These year-
specific factors capture more than survival bias, such as the performance of the overall real 
estate market. In summary, it is likely that survival effects have a significant influence on our 
results. The above tests suggest, however, that the magnitude of these effects is not so large 
as to invalidate our inferences.  
Alternative measures of quality 
          We also performed robustness checks to ensure that our proxy for quality, adjusted 
return over the period 1990 to 1995, is reasonable. One measure of quality is the total 
dividends received until 1990. Table 6 shows an OLS regression (with White’s correction for 
heteroscedasticity) using cumulative dividends as the dependent variable. The table shows 
that in both of the regressions, partnership sequence number has a significantly negative 
affect. This is consistent with our finding that issuance number has a significant negative 
affect on adjusted return.24  
                                                 
22 The mean in-sample return is 12.4% versus 13.5% for the out-of-sample developers; the corresponding t-
statistic is −.47, which is insignificant at all conventional levels. The means test with all of the out-of-sample 
partnerships generates almost precisely the same result.  
23 This regression run was abnormal return on year dummies. The results were abnormal return = -.0035 
dum77 -.0754 dum78 -.0517 dum79 +.034 dum80 + .1309 dum81 +.0067 dum82 +.0823 dum83 -.0151 dum84 + 
.0018 dum85 +.0763 dum86 -.0383 dum87 -.0254 dum88 -.0769 dum89  , Adj R2 = 4.56%, p-value = .034.  
24 A second alternative measure of quality was tested: the Partnership Profile financial condition rating at the 
end of 1989. This rating embodies both quantitative and qualitative aspects of the RELP. We performed an 
ordered probit analysis (not shown here) to predict this rating. While the overall fit was significant, none of the 
key characteristics (partnership issuance number, operating margin, leverage, age and size) were.  
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Ex post analysis 
          One explanation for our findings is that a number of developers exploited the 
informational asymmetries in this market. Informal evidence for this comes from a variety of 
popular press articles. In particular, Prudential Securities, in the fall of 1993, agreed to pay 
$371 million to settle complaints about its sales activity and promised returns in oil and gas 
and real estate limited partnerships. Prudential Securities, in an agreement with the Justice 
Department, admitted to fraud in selling $8 billion of limited partnership units. Our 
statistical analysis suggests that the returns on Angeles-sponsored RELPs appear to be drawn 
from two regimes with the mean return being significantly lower in the second half of its 
offerings.  In a news story that appears to support this conclusion,25 a reporter wrote that 
this: 
West Los Angeles-based company has had an extraordinarily rich history as an incubator 
of some of the greatest investment stars -- and some of the biggest flops -- of the modern era 
… How the 60 year old Elliott (CEO) and his crew avoided the corporate gallows for so 
long is a classic tale of management making promises it couldn’t keep, to investors who 
didn’t know better. 
          Angeles survived several financial crises, including a crash in the ski-resort condo 
market, by focusing on “cash flow” rather than real earnings until the cash flows on 
properties became nonexistent. The crises that finished Angeles involved investing in outlet 
malls and congregate care apartments; both were high-risk ventures involving heavy cash 
infusions.  
          In addition, two of the developers in our sample have gone bankrupt (Integrated 
Resources and Angeles Corporation) and most of the sponsors have changed organizational 
form to convert their RELPs into either real estate investment trusts (REITs) or master 
limited partnerships (MLPs). Shurgard appears to be the only high quality producer on a 
relative basis. Published reports26 on Shurgard seem to support this view. 
                                                 
25 Tom Petruno, May 7, 1993, “Broken promises finally clip the wings of Angeles and its investors,” Los Angeles 
Times. 
26Tim Urbonya, February 28, 1988, “Self-Storage: Success Breeds Change”, New York Times, Section 8, Page 1, 
Column 1.  Karen Milburn, July 2, 1990, “Shurgard and Limited Partners Spawn over 200 Storage Sites”, Puget 
Sound Business Journal 11: pg 19A. Ken Berzof, March 19, 1989, “Investment Patience May Pay Off,” The 
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6. Conclusions 
          This study empirically investigates the dynamics of quality setting and reputation using 
a unique database of returns on a series of real estate limited partnerships by the same 
developer. By examining the time series of a given developer’s performance, we obtain 
important insights into the developer’s strategy in determining its optimal tradeoff between 
reputation and short-term profits. We also obtain some understanding of the extent to which 
investors and RELP developers behave in this informationally opaque market.  
          We find that, as predicted by the Diamond and Shapiro models, in the aggregate, the 
average return declines with offering number. This result could be interpreted as showing 
that several sponsors, such as Angeles, Krupp and Prudential, appear to exploit the 
opportunities created by informational inefficiencies. This is evidenced by the returns on a 
sequence of RELPs issued being initially positive followed by negative returns on subsequent 
offerings. We also find significant evidence that these three developers also engage in mixed 
strategies, shifting between quality regimes, perhaps in an effort to make detection of their 
true quality more difficult.  Furthermore, our empirical results correspond with known ex 
post facts, in particular the negative reports on Krupp and Prudential and the positive 
reports on Shurgard.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Courier-Journal. Jeanne Sather, June 19, 1992, “Commercial Storage Now More of Shurgard Factor,” Puget Sound 
Business Journal 13(6): pg 32. More specifically, news reports indicate that Shurgard has a historical annual 
average return on investment of around 15% (not market adjusted). Shurgard builds and manages over 200 
mini-storage warehouses. Shurgard forms limited partnerships to provide all of the financing for the real estate 
deal with no reliance on debt. 
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Appendix: Empirical methodology 
          This appendix briefly overviews our empirical approaches. Evidence that a developer 
is using a mixing strategy is evaluated using the switching regression model of Quandt (1958, 
1960, 1972).27,28 This model assumes the existence of two regression regimes with a single 
unknown switch point between the two regimes. If there are T observations; the first t 
observations (sequential offerings of RELPs) are assumed to come from a regime with a 
given quality level, while the last T − t observations represent RELP offerings from a 
different quality regime. The null hypothesis that sponsors do not change the level of quality 
in their RELP offerings is tested against the alternative proposition that a single change in 
quality occurs. The problem is to estimate the time, if any, at which the sponsor switches 
from one quality regime to another. We model the two different quality regimes as follows: 
  R t= + +α β ε1 1 1             (1) 
 R t= + +α β ε2 2 2             (2) 
where R is the adjusted holding period return on the tth RELP issued by a particular sponsor, 
and ε1 and ε2 are independent, normally distributed error terms with mean zero and standard 
deviations σ1 and σ2 respectively. This modeling of the quality regimes is motivated by the 
prediction of the Shapiro and Diamond models concerning the declining trend in quality. 
          The estimated location of the unknown (single) switch point t involves choosing as 
the maximum likelihood estimate the value of t that maximizes  
λ π σ( ) log log $ ( ) log $t T t T t T= − − − − −2
21 2
σ
                                                
       (3) 
More specifically, the procedure entails first ordering our RELPs in issuance date sequence. 
Separate regressions are then estimated for each of these groups. Next, the point of division 
between the two groups is moved by one time unit and a new set of regressions is estimated. 
 
27 Brown and Goetzmann (1998) use switching regressions to analyze mutual fund styles. 
28 All of the mixed strategy tests were performed only for those developers for which we had data on at least 
11 partnerships. Eleven of the twenty sponsors qualified under this criterion. The value of this cutoff level is 
somewhat arbitrary. However, reliable estimation of mixed strategies requires a greater number of observations 
than simple mean or variance tests.  
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This process is repeated for all possible division points. There is no unbiased test statistic 
associated with this maximum likelihood procedure, especially in small samples (as in the 
present case) given contamination effects associated with the switch point.29  As such, even 
though a particular plot may suggest that a switch has occurred, this point may not be 
statistically significant. 
          To overcome this deficiency in Quandt’s likelihood ratio (LR) test, Brown, Durbin 
and Evans (BDE) proposed a test of nonstationarity that can be used with the LR test to 
determine if a given switch point is significant.30  In this approach, the recursive residuals, wt, 
are computed as follows 
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Here and $ , $α βt t− −1 1 xt−1  are the least squares estimators and the sample mean based on the 
first t − 1 observations. If the null hypothesis of a constant α and β is true, these residuals 
are independent standard normals. By plotting the cumulative sum of squares, st, defined as  
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       (5) 
against time (number of offerings), we can reject the null hypothesis if the graph of st crosses 
the significance line. Thus, if the switch indicated by the BDE is close to the peak of the 
likelihood ratio, then we can conclude that there exist two distinct regression regimes. 
However, the BDE test could indicate nonstationarity without the LR showing any distinct 
peak. In this case, we would conclude that the quality changed gradually over time.  
                                                 
29 Contamination is associated with the interval around the dividing point between the two groups of 
observations, t and T − t observations. In essence, one doesn’t know which regime the data are associated with. 
30 See Mehta and Beranek (1982) for an application to detecting changes in beta. 
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          Both Quandt’s LR and the BDE test assume that there is a single change in regression 
regimes. However, this need not always be the case. To address this problem, Quandt and 
Ramsey (QR) (1978) propose another test for the existence of two regression regimes. They 
assume that at each point in time, nature (in our case, the developer) picks one regime with 
probability λ  and the other regime with probability 1 − λ.  
          The QR model assumes that the probability density function associated with the 
RELP quality for a given sponsor represents a mixture of (at most) two normal densities.  
The null hypothesis, that sponsors do not change the level of quality in their RELP 
offerings, is tested against the alternative proposition that two quality regimes exists. 
Formally, we model the two different levels of quality as: 
R N with probability
R N with probability
Bt
Bt
~ ( , )
~ ( , ) (
µ σ λ
µ σ λ
1 1
2
2 2
2 1 − )          (6) 
where the parameters λ, µ1, µ2,  and σ  are unknown. The two distributions of returns 
represent two different modes of sponsor behavior with λ measuring the probability that a 
sponsor chooses the first quality level. A disadvantage of this method is that it cannot 
identify which points belong to a particular regime. However, in this study, we are mainly 
interested in the existence of two regimes and identification of the regime to which an 
observation belongs is less important. 
σ12 22
          To estimate the mixture of normal distributions and λ, the moment generating 
function (mgf), E(eθy), is minimized using weighted nonlinear least squares with the number 
(q) of values of θ set equal to fifteen to ensure that the corresponding normal equations are 
of full rank:31 
e
n
 =  e  +  ( e
j i
1 j j
2
2 j j
2
y
i=1
n
+ / 2 + /
θ
µ θ σ θ µ θ σ θλ λ)12 22∑

 1 -
2
                                                
                 j  =  1, 2, ...., 15         (7) 
Since θ‘s determine the weights for the moments of the data by the mgf estimator, relatively 
small θ‘s were chosen (to the extent possible) so that low-order moments receive more 
 
31 This approach can be generalized to switching regressions.  For further details, see Quandt and Ramsey 
(1978). 
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weight.32 The Davidon-Fletcher-Powell algorithm is used to minimize the mgf. The 
parameters are estimated using nonlinear weighted least squares where the weights are the 
reciprocal of the disturbance variance. 
          Quandt and Ramsey (1978) argue that the preceding mgf has several advantages over 
using a maximum likelihood (MLE) function.33 Most importantly, the mgf can be used with 
relatively small samples having considerable overlap in the two populations and the 
parameters obtained are unique estimates. The mgf method also yields consistent and 
asymptotically normal estimates. The asymptotic distribution of the mgf is independent of 
the θ parameters. In conjunction with the estimation of the mixture of normals, we use a 
Wald statistic to determine if the two normal distributions are identical  (Ho: µ1  =  µ2 and  
).   σ σ12 22=
                                                 
32 While Quandt and Ramsey (1978) note that the choice of θ is important when q = 5, Schmidt (1982) has 
found that all reasonable choices of θ lead to the same asymptotic covariance matrix when q = 15 and that this 
matrix represents the lower bounds for the asymptotic variances.  This is further justification for our use of q 
= 15. 
33 Known difficulties with the MLE method include the fact that the estimate may not be obtainable due to the 
unboundedness of the likelihood function. The possibility of a singular matrix of second partials of the log-
likelihood function might also exist when unequal variances are allowed in the components of the mixture.  In 
addition, the finite sample properties of the resulting estimates are unknown. 
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Figure 1: Total Real Estate Limited Partnership (RELP) Volume 
This figure depicts the total RELP volume (in $millions) over our sample period. It 
shows that our sample contains approximately 55% of the total dollar volume. 
RELP volume by year
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89
To
ta
l o
ut
st
an
di
ng
 ($
-m
ill
io
ns
)
Aggregate RELP volume
Sample volume
 
 28
 Figure 2: Returns of Various Sponsors Sorted by Order of RELP Issuance 
This figure plots the adjusted returns for each RELP in its issuance order.  The fitted regression line shows the negative 
trend in the returns. This regression uses White’s correction for heteroscedastic errors. 
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Figure 3:  Excess Returns on RELPs by Sponsor 
This figure shows the excess returns (adjusted for the year of RELP formation) for the six sponsors analyzed in detail. 
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Figure 3:  Excess Returns on RELPs by Sponsor (continued) 
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Figure 4: Comparison of Quandt’s Log Likelihood Ratio with Brown-Durbin-Evans CuSumSq Residuals 
For the six sponsors analyzed in detail, this figure shows the results of Quandt’s and Brown, Durbin, and Evans’ 
estimation of regime shifts. 
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Figure 4: Comparison of Quandt’s Log Likelihood Ratio with Brown-Durbin-Evans CuSumSq Residuals 
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Brown Durb in  Ev ans CSSQR : Krupp 
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Figure 4: Comparison of Quandt’s Log Likelihood Ratio with Brown-Durbin-Evans CuSumSq Residuals 
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Brown Durbin Evans CSSQR : Prudential 
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Quandt Ratio:Shurgard
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Table 1: Sample Characteristics 
Panel A presents descriptive statistics for the complete sample of RELPs. The first 3 rows give 
the average dividend distributions as a percentage of initial capital from the partnership’s 
inception until 1987, 1988 and 1989. The cost basis of the properties is the total capitalized cost 
before depreciation, amortization and property value writedowns. Total leverage is measured 
with respect to the total cost basis of the properties. The Ratings are from Stanger’s 
Partnership Profiles, ranging from 1 (best) to 5. The ratings and the financial statement data 
are as of the end of 1989. 
Panel A: General Characteristics 
Statistic Number of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Cumulative dividends till 1989  135 25.4% 21.2% 
Cumulative dividends till 1988 129 22.8% 19.7% 
Cumulative dividends till 1987 104 21.2% 18.2% 
Leverage 134 27.3% 29.8% 
Operating income (in $000s) 117 2,418 4,004 
Financial condition rating 131 1.69 1.1 
Cash distribution rating 127 3.35 1.31 
Gross revenue (in $000s) 134 7,312 7,506 
Cost basis (in $000s) 134 85,489 90,169 
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Panel B:  Characteristics by Partnership Sequence Number 
Statistic 1 2 3 4 5 
Cumulative dividends till 1989 (%) 39.1 42.6 34.8 30.0 21.9 
Cumulative dividends till 1988 (%) 36.5 34.0 34.4 27.3 19.2 
Cumulative dividends till 1987 (%) 31.9 34.5 27.9 21.1 16.2 
Average year of commencement 1981 1983 1983 1984 1985 
Leverage (%) 31.6 23.5 31.1 23.3 28.1 
Operating income (in $000s) 1,425 2,174 1,458 3,326 3,374 
Financial condition rating 1.85 1.80 2.14 1.93 1.40 
Cash distribution rating 3.36 3.15 3.58 3.43 3.27 
Gross revenue (in $000s) 5,208 6,218 5,402 7,845 7,315 
Cost basis (in $000s) 53,077 64,105 65,778 79,463 85,502 
 
Statistic 6 7 8 9 10 
Cumulative dividends till 1987 (%) 22.6 18.5 23.1 16.3 7.6 
Cumulative dividends till 1988 (%) 19.4 16.0 22.2 12.4 6.6 
Cumulative dividends till 1989 (%) 16.7 11.7 15.3 10.8 4.1 
Average year of commencement 1986 1986 1986 1987 1987 
Leverage (%) 11.7 21.3 18.4 29.0 38.2 
Operating income (in $000s) 4,760 1,773 3,154 1,916 896 
Financial condition rating 1.18 1.33 1.44 1.40 2.00 
Cash distribution rating 2.91 3.22 3.22 3.20 3.75 
Gross revenue (in $000s) 7,576 4,834 6,604 8,341 9,681 
Cost basis (in $000s) 88,934 59,297 88.894 103,288 111,885 
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Table 2: In- and Out-of-Sample Raw Returns by Offering Number 
This table reports the mean semi-annual (raw) return by issuance number for the 253 RELPs 
analyzed (in sample) and for the 52 sponsors that had 5 or fewer RELPs (out of sample). The t-
test for mean differences between the in-sample and out-of-sample groups for offering 
numbers 1 through 5 was insignificant in each case. Only observations 9,11 and 12 in the in-
sample group have a return significantly different from 0 at the .10 level. 
Offer Number Mean Count Mean Count
1 -1.70% 20 7.26% 20
2 8.93% 20 -3.91% 20
3 3.69% 20 1.89% 7
4 1.31% 20 2.81% 2
5 8.19% 20 -8.01% 3
6 -0.77% 20
7 -4.85% 18
8 0.17% 15
9 -6.46% 13
10 5.49% 12
11 -6.15% 11
12 -4.66% 9
13 -1.58% 8
14 -1.13% 6
15 3.50% 5
16 12.76% 3
17 2.31% 3
18 -8.91% 3
19 -12.35% 3
20 18.05% 3
21 -8.85% 3
22 -5.49% 3
23 -8.43% 3
24 -7.13% 2
25 -15.48% 2
26 -5.89% 2
27 -29.62% 2
28 -9.55% 2
29 -13.42% 1
30 -3.95% 1
In-Sample Out-of-Sample
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Table 3: Tests for Mixed Strategy Using Normal Mixtures 
To estimate the mixture of normals, the following moment generating function (mgf) 
is minimized using weighted nonlinear least squares with j = 15 to ensure that the 
corresponding normal equations are of full rank: 
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Here yi represents the abnormal return (in percentage) for the ith RELP offering of a sponsor.  
Parameter restrictions are tested using a Wald test with the level of significance reported in 
the last column of the following table. The null hypothesis is that µ1 = µ2 and σ1 = σ2, i.e., that 
observations are drawn from a single normal distribution. Here * indicates significant at the 
.10 level, ** indicates significant at the .05 level. 
 
RELP Sponsor λ µ1 µ2 σ1 σ2 σResid Max 
θj 
Min θj Wald Test 
Aggregate .43 ∗∗ 4.7  −3.6 ∗∗ 2.9 2.0 .0001 .09 −.23 .000 ∗∗ 
Angeles .91∗∗ −5.4∗∗ 28.7∗∗ 4.5∗∗ 2.0 .0008 .19 −.13 .000 ∗∗ 
Insured .01 13.0 −1.5 7.2 5.4 ∗∗ .0036 .17 −.15 .009 ∗∗ 
JMB .02 18.9∗∗ −4.1∗∗ 33.0 ∗∗ 19.8 ∗∗ .0053 .07 −.08 .000 ∗∗ 
Krupp .30∗∗ 44.9∗∗ −11.5∗∗ 17.6 ∗∗ 3.2∗∗ .0026 .03 −.25 .000 ∗∗ 
Prudential .88 ∗∗ −4.1∗∗ 21.6∗∗ 3.5 3.2 .0027 .21 −.07 .000 ∗∗ 
Shurgard .52 −2.4 6.3 3 3.3 .0014 .15 −.17 .465 
 ∗∗
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Table 4: Tests of Mean and Variance Shifts 
This table shows the results of testing for significant differences between the means 
and variances of sponsor returns in the first and second half of their offerings. Here * 
indicates significant at the .10 level, ** indicates significant at the .05 level. 
 
   Mean tests 
t/Hsu statistics 
 
10% value   
Variance tests 
F statistic 
 
p-value for F 
Aggregate    1.65∗  1.36 1.49 .32 
 Angeles     1.50∗  1.43  6.85∗∗  2.71 × 10−2 
 Balcor    0.55  1.31  0.44  0.93 
 Century    4.87∗∗  1.43  2.44  0.24 
 CNL    2.12∗∗  1.47  1.68  0.32 
 Consolidated    1.19  1.43  2.11  0.27 
 CPA     1.23  1.39  3.15  0.14 
 Damson    5.23 ×10−2  1.53  1.55  0.39 
 Dean Witter    0.51  1.47  2.54  0.22 
 First Capital    −0.47  1.38  1.48 × 10−2  0.99 
 Insured    1.51∗  1.35  1.32  0.35 
 Integrated     0.84  1.36  1.29  0.37 
 JMB     1.56∗  1.31  2.01  0.11 
 Krupp     2.60∗∗  1.43  139.38∗∗  4.05 × 10−6 
 McNeil     0.58  1.41  1.56  0.32 
 MLH      3.48 × 10−2  1.53  7.16  0.12 
 Prudential     3.76∗∗  1.41  4.37∗∗  4.77 × 10−2 
 Public Storage   −0.24  1.47  1.42 × 10−2  0.98 
 RIC      −0.65  1.38  4.02 × 10−3  0.99 
 Shearson    0.84  1.32  0.55  0.81 
 Shurgard   −3.58  1.35  0.40  0.85 
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 Table 5: Correlation of Median Returns 
This table shows correlations between sponsor characteristics and median raw returns. 
Significance levels are indicated in parentheses. Npart is the number of partnerships that each 
developer sponsored in our sample; Public is a dummy variable with 1 denoting a sponsor 
that is publicly traded;  SIC is the number of SICs that the developer (or its parent) is engaged 
in; Devel is a dummy variable with 1 denoting a sponsor that is primarily a developer;  
Offsize is the total size of all offerings of the developer; Medret is the sponsor’s overall 
median raw return. 
 
 Npart Public SIC Developer Offsize Medret 
Npart 1.000      
Public .013 
(.958) 
1.000     
SIC .042 
(.862) 
.629 
(.003) 
1.000    
Developer .148 
(.532) 
−.453 
(.045) 
−.499 
(.025) 
1.000   
Offsize .750 
(.000) 
−.043 
(.857) 
.066 
(.783) 
.127 
(.594) 
1.000  
Medret −.035 
(.884) 
−.217 
(.359) 
−.366 
(.113) 
.342 
(.140) 
−.156 
(.512) 
1.000 
 
 
  46
  47
Table 6: Regressions on Dividends Paid 
This table displays the results of two regressions with the dependent variable being the sum of all dividends 
(paid from issuance date to the end of 1989) as a percentage of offering size. Partnership number is the 
offering number for the given sponsor. PPI financial condition rating is the Stanger rating as of 1989. 
Operating margin is operating income in 1989 over gross 1989 revenues. Leverage is total debt over the 
partnership’s cost basis as of 1989. Age of the partnership is the number of years from the offering date 
until 1989. Initial capital raised is total offering size. All regressions use the White correction for 
heteroscedasticity. The regressions also used fixed effects to account for sponsor characteristics; these 
coefficients are not shown in order to focus on the more relevant issues. The number of observations varies 
because of the lack of accounting data for some partnerships.  
 
 Model I 
Coefficient   
p-value 
Model II 
Coefficient   
p-value 
Constant 0.408 
(.000) 
0.327 
(.019) 
Partnership issuance number -0.172 
(.000) 
-0.012 
(.029) 
PPI financial condition rating  -0.020 
(.157) 
Operating margin  0.079 
(.375) 
Leverage (%)  -0.312 
(.005) 
Age of partnership  0.052 
(.000) 
Log of initial offering size (in millions)  -0.054 
(.006) 
Number of observations 134 115 
Adjusted R2 48.5% 77.8% 
Regression p-value .000 .000 
 
